In this paper, we propose an application-based Secure VLAN (S-VLAN) architecture, which is one of infrastructure-based active security mechanisms, for switched LAN connected to Internet.
Introduction
Normally, security and access control policies rely on features from the host operating system. But what if the owner of the host is untrustworthy, or the host is simply too "dumb" to support such policies? In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of using the first point of attachment to the network to enforce these policies, and we propose an application-based Secure VLAN (S-VLAN) architecture for carrying out these tasks. Our S-VLAN approach can completely secure a particular network application from unauthorized access, without any changes to the hosts and requiring only minimal changes to existing standardized LAN components. We also describe our experiences from a prototype implementation of the S-VLAN concept, for applications including VoIP.
S-VLAN Architecture
The main components of our S-VLAN architecture are shown in Figure 1 . First, we assume that users connect to the network via untrusted end hosts, which may not properly authenticate the users nor enforce the appropriate access control policies -making them potential sources for malicious behavior. Conversely, we also don't know how capable the hosts would be at defending themselves if they became targets for malicious behavior.
The trusted edge switch is the most critical component in our design. Each trusted switch is responsible for user authentication at the network boundary, as a precondition for allowing the corresponding host to access the network and other remote resources. 1 Thereafter, the trusted edge switch enforces user-specific resource allocation and access control policies on all inbound and outbound for that host, according to an arbitrary set of multi-layer firewall access control rules -which might include MAC-layer source and destination addresses, VLAN ID, protocol/Ethertype, IPlayer source or destination addresses, application-specific port numbers, etc. Indeed, these rules may even be dynamic, using session information maintained by the trusted switch.
The rest of the local network consists of an arbitrary collection of core switches and other edge switches. All core switches must be 802.1Q tagged VLAN-aware, and their configurations must be changed to include an additional tagged VLAN, which spans all of our trusted edge switches and is intended for their private use. We make no special assumptions about the capabilities and/or configurations of the other edge switches that do not participate in our target application. In this way, we avoid the "forklift upgrade", where we must replace the entire network to make it safe to deploy a new security-sensitive application.
The additional tagged VLAN forms a secure overlay net- 1 We assume that a host-independent method such as the IEEE 802.1X Port Based Network Access Control standard [1] is used, and that the trusted switch has a direct connection to each host through a dedicated link (so it can prevent a malicious user from bypassing the authentication process by hijacking the link from another host that has already been authenticated).
work to interconnect the set of trusted edge switches. Packets can only enter this S-VLAN if the sender is an authenticated host directly connected to a trusted edge switch, the content of the packet satisfied the inbound multilayer firewall access control rules for the input port, and the destination is on a different trusted edge switch. All packets are encrypted for transmission over the S-VLAN to protect them from disclosure and tampering by third parties. By performing packet encryption/decryption at S-VLAN entry points, we reduce the workload on the end hosts and simplify keymanagement because they don't need to be changed for every session. Although this is similar to IPSec operating in tunnel mode, our encryption method operates at layer-2 and includes the source and destination MAC addresses (i.e., layer-2 NAT) so we can trivially interconnect all trusted edge switches by a single S-VLAN tunnel. In this case, the standard MAC-address learning algorithm in the core switches will automatically "do the right thing", i.e., broadcast the packet over the entire S-VLAN if its (encrypted) layer-2 destination is unrecognized, or unicast it to the right location otherwise. The format of encrypted and NAT-ed S-VLAN traffic is shown as in Figure 2 . 
S-VLAN Implementation
We implemented a proof-of-concept SVLAN testbed similar to Figure 1 . We used Linux Mandrake 9.1, kernel 2.6.0 with bridging enabled and built-in layer 2 firewall (ebtables) support, to implement S-VLAN enabled trusted edge switches, and an Extreme Networks Summit 48i switch to represent the core network. We extended ebtables as a multi-layer firewall and revised one of its targets as S-VLAN entry. The cryptographic algorithm used is AES [3] , as it is suitable for hardware implementation in the future. Key management (bootstrap, key agreement and management) is currently done manually. In the future, we plan to use an out-of-band control channel for key exchanges.
Experiments and Results
We tested network applications that use static port numbers (ssh and ping) and dynamic port numbers (the Linux VoIP client ohphone). We used ethereal [4] to monitor traffic over the S-VLAN links. We found that ethereal could not decode the S-VLAN packets beyond saying they were 802.1Q VLAN compliant. As we expected, the source and destination MAC addresses, and the L2 payload were all hidden by the encrypt process.
We also tested the case where an "attacker", who enters the network through an untrusted "weak" edge switch as shown Figure 1 , attempts to use the secured application, say ssh. Although the "attacker" could still connect to other services on a host protected by a trusted switch (and portmap showed the ports were "open"), it could not connect to it using ssh (and portmap showed the port was "filtered"). At the same time, the protected host was completely unaware that the "attacker" was trying to connect to it via ssh, and it could also make ssh connections to other hosts protected by a different trusted edge switch. We even tried misconfiguring the rest of the network to add the untrusted weak switch to the S-VLAN (giving it the same VLAN ID). As expected, the results we got were the same as above, since the misconfigured switches were not configured to participate in the S-VLAN and did not know the encryption key. This demonstrated that our S-VLAN architecture can indeed control all accesses to a secured application from the trust edge switches, even if there are misconfigured switches elsewhere in the network.
Finally, we measured the performance of VoIP calls between two end hosts. We found that the round trip time, numbers of packets dropped, numbers of packets received out-of-order, and numbers of packets that arrived late did not change significantly when we added the S-VLAN.
Conclusions
We designed an application-based S-VLAN architecture and implemented a prototype system. S-VLAN is suitable for hot spots, universities and enterprises LANs and can efficiently prevent insider security problems from interrupting secured applications. Moreover, S-VLAN is simpler and more efficient than IPSec in LAN environment as it conforms to Layer 2 semantics, and it is cost efficient for realtime applications such as VoIP.
